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1 Introduction
Worldwide nominal in- and outﬂows of foreign direct investment grew from
about 40-60 billions of US dollar in 1982 to about 1200 billion US dollar in
2000. The average growth rates of foreign direct investment are much higher
than those of GDP or even trade (UNCTAD 2001, OECD 1999). Some authors
argue that economic inﬂuence on the political process has grown due to this
aspect of globalization (e.g. Reich (1993), Summers (1999)). This perception
sometimes culminates in the notion of the ’loss of sovereignty’ of the nation
state. It reﬂects the idea that national governments lost most of their discretion
to set policy, because the bargaining position of multinational companies vis
a vis the government has improved. The reason is that ﬁrms relocate their
production plants if governments set unwanted policies. As governments care
about the presence of these ﬁrms, they must succumb to the wishes of the
multinationals. A ”race to the bottom” (Rauscher 1995) ensues.
and there is almost no discretion left to set national policy.1
The aim of this paper is to analyze diﬀerences in lobbying incentives between
multinational and national ﬁrms, and show how they aﬀect the political out-
come. The paper attempts to address the following questions: How do lobbying
incentives of multinationals diﬀer from those of national ﬁrms? Will their in-
ﬂuence be higher or smaller? What is the political outcome if multinationals
are present: Will regulation be more lax? To answer these questions, the
distinction between a national and a multinational ﬁrm needs to be clariﬁed.
Obviously, a multinational produces in at least two regions, in contrast to a
national ﬁrm. But this distinction lacks precision: In principle, national ﬁrms
may also relocate production abroad as a reaction towards rigid domestic reg-
ulation, and thus become a multinational. Accordingly, each national must be
regarded as a potential multinational.
My approach takes Hirschman’s famous distinction between ”exit” and ”voice”
as mechanisms to react to adverse circumstances as a starting point (Hirschman
1970). I deﬁne a multinational as a ﬁrm which can relocate production with
smaller moving costs than a national ﬁrm. To justify this view, consider a
ﬁrm which intends to relocate production. A multinational possesses general
skills and knowledge which are essential for operation in foreign countries. For
instance, it possesses a network for cross-border communication, has knowl-
edge how to handle cultural diﬀerences and is accustomed to foreign law. A
national ﬁrm lacks such knowledge. In addition, if the multinational already
runs a plant in the foreign country, expanding this plant will generally cause
smaller costs than building a plant from scratch, which is necessary if a national
1Compare also Janeba (2000) and the quoted literature there.
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ﬁrm wants to move abroad. Hence ”exit” as a reaction towards tight regulation
induces smaller costs for multinationals than for national ﬁrms. In contrast
”voice”, namely the eﬀort to reduce domestic regulation through lobbying, is
equally available to both ﬁrms.
I will show that it is not obvious in such a setup that multinationals have
more inﬂuence on the political process than national ﬁrms: On the one hand,
a multinational might have smaller stakes in the home market. It can move
at least a part of the production to a foreign country if the government sets
unwanted regulation. The option to escape national regulation tends to reduce
incentives to engage in lobbying activities against it. It should be expected
that this eﬀect leads to less political inﬂuence of multinationals. On the other
hand, a government might be interested that multinationals produce at home.
For instance, it might care about local production, the number of ﬁrms in the
domestic market, or tax revenue. This aspect tends to improve the inﬂuence of
multinational companies on national regulation. In sum, even though lobbying
activities of multinationals might be less intense, they might also be more
successful.
This paper contributes to the existing literature on lobbying in the presence
of multinational ﬁrms. Several authors analyze the eﬀect of foreign direct
investment on the level of domestic protection. According to this view, in-
vestment activities soften adjustment costs induced through increased import
penetration. The relocation of production facilities is a means to soften polit-
ical pressures for increased protection. Not being cost reducing per se, direct
investment serves as a ”Quid Pro Quo” to reduce protection in the host coun-
try (compare for instance Bhagwati, Dinopoulos and Won (1987), Bhagwati,
Dinopoulos and Wong (1992), or Grossman and Helpman (1996).) Other con-
tributions analyze inward foreign investment ﬂows as a reaction towards high
protection in a country. If the protected industry is less concerned about com-
petition through imports than competition through new investments, the pos-
sibility to relocate production as a response towards high protection restricts
trade impeding measures. According to this view, foreign direct investment
follows trade policy. It is economically eﬃcient and restrains protective be-
havior of the host country. (Compare Blonigen and Ohno (1998), Ellingsen
and Warneryd (1999). For a variation of this theme, Hillman and Ursprung
(1999).). Although these two approaches diﬀer with respect to the timing of
the investment decision and the cost eﬃciency of relocation, they depart from
the assumption that only domestic ﬁrms inﬂuence the political process.
To my best knowledge, there are only few approaches which allow also for
lobbying of foreign ﬁrms. For instance, Konishi, Saggi and Weber (1999) ex-
tend the analyzes of Ellingsen and Warneryd (1999) and analyze foreign direct
investment as a reaction towards high protection when foreign and domestic
- 2-
Lobbying Activities of Multinational Firms A. Polk
ﬁrms lobby a government. Olarreaga (1999) and Hillman and Ursprung (1993)
regard the location structure as exogenously given and analyze the eﬀect of a
higher degree of foreign owned ﬁrms on domestic protection. In contrast to
these latter approaches, in my approach the location structure is endogenously
determined as a reaction towards tight regulation. Moreover, my approach has
a diﬀerent focus on the lobbying interest of foreign and domestic ﬁrms. The
existing literature assumes divergent interests in trade policy between foreign
and domestic ﬁrms. In contrast, my approach focuses on diﬀerent incentives
to engage in lobbying activities given that both types of ﬁrms prefer the same
policy outcome, namely low regulation. Are multinational ﬁrms stronger than
national ﬁrms in the political contest?
This paper is organized as follows: The ﬁrst part (sections 2 and 3) derives
diﬀerences in lobbying incentives between national and multinational ﬁrms. I
employ a reduced form model of imperfect competition, which can easily be
applied to speciﬁc market forms. The insights of the general model then work
as a basis for the lobbying game in the second part (section 4). It investigates
how ﬁrms determine contributions to the government, and derives the political
outcome. Section 5 ﬁnally concludes.
2 The basic set-up
There are two countries (’home’ and ’foreign’), which are separated by trans-
portation costs s. Production in the home country is subject to real valued
regulation r > 0, which decreases variable proﬁts. The producing ﬁrm is either
a national ﬁrm or a multinational. Production in the foreign country is not
subject to regulation. One might think of r as a tax, environmental regulation,
or a product standard which increases costs.2 The foreign country does not
set any policy, independent of the home country’s policy choice. The home
country can thus be interpreted as being small.3
2Note that the type of regulation in this model does not inﬂuence the characteristics of
the good. Goods produced at home and in the foreign country are homogenous, independent
of the level of domestic regulation. The idea is that regulation does not serve as a means
to diﬀerentiate domestic from foreign goods. This type of regulation applies for instance to
environmental standards, which aﬀect the way a good is produced, but not the good itself
(i.e. water and air pollution, waste management, social security standards etc.). Other
examples are competition policies aﬀecting the degree of competition in a market (and hence
proﬁts), or tax policies. The model does not cover regulation policies which diﬀerentiate the
good subject to regulation from others, as for instance laws which prohibit certain ingredients
in food. Moreover, the model does not apply to regulation which aﬀects production in both
countries, as for instance general labor standards or tariﬀs.
3In this section I assume that regulation is exogenous. I will determine regulation en-
dogenously in section 4.
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I analyze the location decision of a multinational ﬁrm, which initially produces
in the home country and serves the foreign country through exports. The ﬁrm
can react to a change in national regulation via relocation: It can either stay in
the home country and export to the other country, or it can relocate partially
or completely to the foreign country. In the latter case, it serves the market of
the home country through exports. Relocation has two eﬀects on proﬁts. First,
variable proﬁts change, because the marginal costs of production depend on
national regulation and transportation costs. Second, total proﬁts are aﬀected,
because the ﬁrm faces ﬁxed moving costs if it relocates production.
I assume that the proﬁts of the ﬁrm depend on the policy choice r, on trans-
portation costs s and on the location decision l. Markets are imperfect, and
proﬁt functions are given in reduced form. It is assumed that a unique solu-
tion to the product market game exists, with equilibrium quantities denoted
as q(r).4 Firm’s proﬁts can then be written in reduced form as
Π = Πl(r, s)− δF l.
The superscript l ∈ {nr, pr, cr} denotes the location choice of the multina-
tional ﬁrm. nr means ’no relocation’, pr means ’partial relocation’ and cr
means ’complete relocation’. Location structure nr is the starting point of
the analysis. The ﬁrm produces in the home country and serves the foreign
market through exports. Parameter δ is a dummy, which is equal to one if the
ﬁrm relocates (partially or completely). If it does not relocate, then no ﬁxed
costs arise and δ = 0. Note that the ﬁxed moving costs F l are indexed as well.
The model allows for diﬀerent levels of these costs dependent on the choice of
location.
To analyze diﬀerences in lobbying incentives between a national and a multi-
national ﬁrm, I consider the eﬀect of a policy change on proﬁts for two types of
ﬁrms: (i) If the ﬁrm is a multinational, the location structure is an endogenous
choice variable. The multinational might react to the policy choice through
relocation. The location decision depends on transportation costs, the amount
of regulation, and ﬁxed moving costs. I will derive conditions in section 3, such
that the multinational takes advantage of this opportunity. (ii) If the ﬁrm is
a national ﬁrm, it cannot relocate production. The location structure is given
exogenously as l = nr in this case. A national ﬁrm is restricted to produce in
the home country and serve the foreign country through exports, irrespective
of the amount of regulation r.
The following deﬁnition summarizes the approach:
4Since the model allows for international trade, the amount of goods consumed in the
home country qD may diﬀer from the amount of goods produced in the home country, qS .
This distinction will not be used in this section, but in section 4.
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Deﬁnition 1 A national ﬁrm has location structure l = nr. Proﬁts of a
national ﬁrm are given by
ΠNAT (r, s) = Πnr (s, r) .
A multinational ﬁrm chooses its location structure endogenously. Proﬁts of the
multinational are
ΠMNE(r, s) = max
l
{
Πl (s, r)− δF l} , l ∈ {nr, pr, cr} .
The idea that the national ﬁrm cannot move may appear overly restrictive. A
national ﬁrm might also be able to relocate production and become a multina-
tional, although at higher costs. The reasons for this assumption is tractabil-
ity: If the national ﬁrm is also allowed to relocate production, the following
arguments are still valid if moving costs of the national ﬁrm are higher than
those of the multinational. The focus is on diﬀerences in proﬁts between a
multinational and a national ﬁrm, and the resulting diﬀerences in lobbying in-
centives. These exist whenever moving costs diﬀer. Hence I normalize moving
costs to be prohibitively high, such that the national ﬁrm will never relocate
production, even though in principle it could.
Figure 1 illustrates an arbitrary proﬁt function of the multinational, which is
the upper bound of the proﬁt functions for each location decision. The proﬁt
function of the national ﬁrm is given by Πnr.
The aim is to derive some general principles on how multinational and national
ﬁrms diﬀer in their inﬂuence on the political process. The structure of the
model is very general and does not rely on any speciﬁc form of competition at
this stage. It entails only some general assumptions on the behavior and shape
of the proﬁt functions, which are satisﬁed in most models of competition.
The ﬁrst assumption deﬁnes critical upper and lower bounds for transportation
costs s and the regulation parameter r. It serves to exclude some rather
uninteresting cases: For instance, if transportation costs were allowed to be
very high, both markets would be completely separated. Then it could never
be the case that the multinational relocates completely and serves the domestic
market through exports. Hence, either the multinational produces in the home
country; then there is no diﬀerence between the national and the multinational
ﬁrm. Or the multinational produces abroad; but then national regulation does
not aﬀect it at all, because markets are completely separated. To exclude this
uninteresting case, transportation costs are bounded above, and it is always
possible to serve a market through exports.
The regulation parameter is also bounded above. Regulation increases the cost
of production. Thus very strict regulation can lead to negative variable proﬁts
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Figure 1: Proﬁts of the multinational depend on the location decision l ∈
{nr, pr, cr}. It is the upper bound of national ﬁrm’s proﬁts (printed in bold-
face).
of the national ﬁrm. To exclude this case, I restrict the parameter range or
r. Regulation will never drive the national ﬁrm out of the market.5 Note
that the upper bound for r may depend on the exogenous parameter s, that
is r = r(s). The same applies for s, which may be a function of the realized
level of regulation, s = s(r):
Assumption 1 a) Upper bounds for r and s exist: Variable proﬁts are neg-
ative for any value of s, if r > r. Markets are completely separated by trans-
portation costs for any value of r, if s > s.
b) The government sets regulation, such that proﬁts are positive if production
takes place in the home country: r ∈ [0, r].
Transportation costs do not separate the markets completely, and both countries
can be served through exports: s ∈ [0, s].
The next two assumptions state how regulation aﬀects proﬁts in the home
country. Regulation decreases proﬁts if the ﬁrm produces at least partly in
the home country. This is a rather intuitive assumption and is satisﬁed for
most forms of competition.6 If production takes place in the foreign country
5This implies that the multinational is not driven out of the market either, because it
can always perform at least as good as the national ﬁrm.
6A contrary view for the special case of environmental regulation is given by Porter (1991)
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only, regulation in the home country may increase or decrease proﬁts of the
multinational. The eﬀect is ambiguous and depends on the speciﬁc form of
competition. For instance, I allow for circumstances where ﬁrms beneﬁt from
raising rivals’ costs, as is the case in the application to Cournot competition
discussed in section 3.2.7
Assumption 2 If a ﬁrm produces at least partly in the home country, regu-
lation decreases proﬁts: ∂Π
l(s,r)
∂r
< 0, if l ∈ {nr, pr}. If the multinational does
not produce in the home country, regulation aﬀects its proﬁts monotonically.
Since regulation aﬀects only domestic production, but not production abroad,
it is intuitive to assume that regulation has a higher impact if more production
takes place in the home country. Note that the assumption allows that proﬁts
depend positively on regulation if the multinational produces solely in the
foreign country. I make the following assumption on the impact of regulation
on proﬁts:8
Assumption 3 There is a positive relationship between the extent of produc-
tion in the home country and the eﬀect of regulation on proﬁts, that is
∂Πnr(r, s)
∂r
≤ ∂Π
pr(r, s)
∂r
≤ ∂Π
cr(r, s)
∂r
.
Moving costs depend on the location structure in the following sense:
Assumption 4 Moving costs depend on the type of relocation: If the ﬁrm
relocates completely to the foreign country, ﬁxed moving costs are higher than
with partial relocation, i.e. F cr ≥ F pr. With no relocation, δ = 0, otherwise
δ = 1.
Assumption 4 is a ’monotonicity assumption’ on the amount of ﬁxed moving
costs, which assures that each location structure is optimal for a speciﬁc pa-
rameter range. If this assumption did not hold and F cr < F pr, it would never
be optimal to relocate partially: Suppose that regulation is low and production
in the home country is optimal. If regulation increases such that it becomes
and Porter and van der Linde (1995). However, their argument relies on some speciﬁc
conditions and cannot be sustained for environmental regulation in general (Schmutzler
2001).
7In a basic model of Cournot competition, proﬁts of the multinational increase if the
competitor in the home market faces higher variable costs through regulation.
8Note that this assumption can be written in a more intuitive, but slightly less precise
way as
∣∣∣∂Πnr(r,s)∂r ∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣∂Πpr(r,s)∂r ∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣∂Πcr(r,s)∂r ∣∣∣.
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Figure 2: Possible proﬁt functions of the national and the multinational ﬁrm
satisfying assumptions 1 to 4.
optimal to relocate, partial relocation is no option. The reason is that partial
relocation has two negative eﬀects compared to complete relocation: First, the
ﬁrm escapes national regulation only partly, which leads leads to lower vari-
able proﬁts compared to complete relocation. Second, ﬁxed moving costs are
higher. However, transportation costs could be saved. But since it was optimal
to bear transportation costs in the ﬁrst place with slightly lower regulation,
transportation costs cannot be the sole reason to relocate partially.9
Figure 2 provides examples on how the proﬁt functions of the multinational
and the national ﬁrm might look like.
I will denote the loss of proﬁts through regulation as the ’stakes’ of a ﬁrm
in the home market. The stakes of a ﬁrm deﬁne possible beneﬁts through
lobbying. If the multinational has smaller stakes in the home market than
a national ﬁrm, regulation aﬀects the ﬁrm to a smaller extent. Other things
equal, this should result in a smaller interest for the multinational to engage
in costly lobbying.
The following deﬁnition states the idea of smaller stakes in the home market
formally. In the remainder of the paper, I will use the following notation: ∆ ≡
r−r0 is the change in regulation from r0 to r, ∆ΠMNE(r, s,∆) ≡ ΠMNE(r, s)−
ΠMNE(r −∆, s) denotes the corresponding proﬁt change of the multinational
ﬁrm, and ∆ΠNAT (r, s,∆) ≡ ΠNAT (r, s)−ΠNAT (r−∆, s) for the national. Note
that if r > r0, ∆ΠNAT (r, s,∆) < 0, but ∆ΠMNE(r, s,∆) ≷ 0 by assumptions
2 and 3.10
9Note that proﬁts decrease continuously in regulation by assumption 2. Moreover, they
decrease faster with partial relocation by assumption 3.
10Note that ΠMNE(r, s) denotes the proﬁts of the multinational which result from the
maximization problem over the location decision.
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Deﬁnition 2 For a given level of transportation costs s, the multinational
company has smaller stakes in the home country compared to a national ﬁrm,
if and only if∣∣∆ΠMNE(r, s,∆)∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∆ΠNAT (r, s,∆)∣∣ for all r, ∆
and ∣∣∆ΠMNE(r, s,∆)∣∣ < ∣∣∆ΠNAT (r, s,∆)∣∣ for at least one pair of r, ∆.
3 The interest of MNEs in national policies
3.1 A general model
To analyze diﬀerences in lobbying between a multinational and a national
ﬁrm, incentives to lobby need to be distinguished from the impact of lobbying
on the policy decision. This section focusses on the incentives to inﬂuence
political decisions. I show that multinational companies have diﬀerent stakes
in domestic regulation than national ﬁrms. The result of this section will then
be used in section 4, which focusses on the eﬀectiveness of lobbying.
Whether a multinational has smaller stakes in the home market than a national
ﬁrm depends on the relationship of the exogenous parameters for transporta-
tion costs s, regulation r and ﬁxed moving costs F l. When the multinational
decides if to relocate production, it has to take diﬀerent aspects into account.
First, if it relocates, ﬁxed moving costs reduce proﬁts. On the other hand,
relocation serves to escape national regulation, and proﬁts decline to a smaller
extent. Therefore the relation between ﬁxed moving costs and the change in
variable proﬁts through regulation is essential for the decision to relocate pro-
duction. Second, if the multinational relocates, variable costs change because
transportation costs become more or less important. For instance, if the multi-
national relocates partially, transportation costs become less important. If it
relocates completely, the importance of transportation costs increases.
To illustrate these aspects, take the initial location structure as a starting
point. The multinational produces in the home country only. If it relocates
partially, it saves transportation costs, because the foreign market tends to be
served by local production. The gain from relocation is two-fold: The ﬁrm
escapes national regulation and saves transportation costs. Next, suppose the
ﬁrm is present in both markets. When it decides if to relocate completely, it
has to bear increased transportation costs to serve the home market, which
cannot be served by local production anymore. Therefore, the gain is to escape
- 9-
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national regulation, but only at the cost of higher ﬁxed and transportation
costs.
The optimal location decision is determined by the amount of ﬁxed costs which
have to be paid for relocation, given speciﬁc values of transportation costs and
regulation.11 The following proposition speciﬁes this:
Proposition 1 Suppose the following conditions are satisﬁed:
(i) F pr < Πpr(r, s)− Πnr(r, s) or
F cr < Πcr(r, s)− Πnr(r, s).
(ii) F pr > Πpr(0, s)− Πnr(0, s).
The multinational has the same stakes in the home market compared to a
national ﬁrm if regulation is lax (i.e. for small r). If the regulation gets tighter
and reaches a critical level, the multinational has smaller stakes in the home
market than a national ﬁrm.
Proof. The proof is given in the appendix.
The multinational has the same stakes as a national ﬁrm if it produces in the
home country only. This is the case if it is optimal to produce at home with
the smallest possible regulation. If this was not the case, it would never be
optimal to produce in the home country only, because variable proﬁts decline
in r. Condition (ii) of the proposition states the respective condition: If, for the
smallest level of regulation, the diﬀerence in proﬁts between partial relocation
and no relocation is smaller than the amount of necessary ﬁxed costs to relocate
partially, it is not proﬁtable to relocate production. Complete production in
the home country is the best location structure in this case.
If regulation becomes tighter, the multinational must have an incentive to
move abroad. If this is not the case, diﬀerences between multinational and
national companies do not exist. We must assure that the multinational has
an incentive to relocate production either partially or completely for some
regulation parameter r. It suﬃces to consider the upper bound r, because
variable proﬁts decline in r. Condition (i) states these requirements: Fixed
costs for either partial or complete relocation must be less than the diﬀerence in
proﬁts between some type of relocation and production at home, if regulation
is strictest. These conditions are suﬃcient, because proﬁts are continuous
and declining in r if production takes at least partially place in the home
country (assumption 2 and 3). An interval of regulation exists, which induces
relocation of the multinational. The national ﬁrm cannot move by deﬁnition.
11Figure 2 shows that ﬁxed costs shift the proﬁt functions vertically. Their value is
essential for the determination of the optimal location structure.
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As a result, both ﬁrms face diﬀerent proﬁts with high regulation, if condition
(i) of proposition 1 applies.
Note that we are not primarily interested in the diﬀerence in proﬁts, but in
diﬀerent stakes between the national and the multinational ﬁrm. The term
’stakes’ accrues to a change in proﬁts due to a change in regulation, not to the
height of proﬁts per se (compare deﬁnition 2). Proposition 1 implies that the
multinational has higher proﬁts than the national ﬁrm if regulation is tight,
and that there is no diﬀerence in proﬁts if regulation is lax. Trivially, the latter
case implies that both types of ﬁrms have the same stakes in the home market
if regulation is low. If proﬁts are identical, both ﬁrms have the same stakes.
However, condition (i) alone does not imply that the multinational has smaller
stakes in the home market if regulation is high. It only implies that proﬁts are
diﬀerent; but even though the amount of proﬁts is diﬀerent, the stakes of both
ﬁrms may be the same if they are aﬀected through a change in regulation in
the same way.
It is assumptions 2 and 3 which assure that diﬀerent proﬁts lead to diﬀerent
stakes. Unequal proﬁts result from diﬀerent location structures. Assumption
2 implies that proﬁts decrease in regulation if the ﬁrm produces in the home
country. This assumption alone is not suﬃcient to induce diﬀerent stakes
between the ﬁrms. Assumption 3 assures that the extent of regulation on
proﬁts increases if more production takes place at home. The combination of
these two assumptions leads to the result of proposition 1. Figure 3 illustrates
it graphically.12
If the general model is applied to speciﬁc forms of competition, proposition 1
gives upper and lower bounds for ﬁxed moving costs, which depend on trans-
portation costs and regulation. If moving costs are above the upper bound,
relocation is no means to escape regulation. The cost of moving abroad exceeds
its beneﬁts, which is less impact of regulation and possibly lower transporta-
tion costs. In this case no diﬀerences between a multinational and a national
ﬁrm exist.
The following corollary contrasts this to the case where the multinational has
always smaller stakes in the home market, independent of the regulation in
place. Intuitively, this is the case if moving costs are small relative to possible
gains of relocation. Corollary 1 gives conditions only on the upper bound of
ﬁxed costs. The intuition is analogous to the one of proposition 1. I simply
state the result, the left part of ﬁgure 2 plots a corresponding situation. Note
that a condition similar to condition (i) of the previous proposition is not
necessary. Proﬁts decline faster in regulation if more production takes place
12Note that the argument does not rely on the type of relocation (partially or completely).
The relevant condition is that production moves at all.
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Figure 3: A national and multinational ﬁrm have diﬀerent stakes in regulation
if regulation is high. If it is low, both ﬁrms have the same stakes. The multina-
tional completely relocates if regulation is strict and ﬁxed costs are small. In
this case transportation costs tend to be small, such that complete relocation
becomes an option if regulation is suﬃciently high (left). If ﬁxed costs for
complete relocation are high, or transportation costs play an important role,
complete relocation is never optimal (right).
in the home country. The stated condition thus also implies condition (i) of
proposition 1.
Corollary 1 Suppose the following condition is satisﬁed:
F pr < Πpr(0, s)− Πnr(0, s).
The multinational has smaller stakes in the home market compared to a na-
tional ﬁrm, independent of the regulation r.
Proof. Follows immediately from the proof of proposition 1.
3.2 An application to Cournot competition
This section applies the general model to a basic two-stage game. Firms play
Cournot competition and face linear demand. The regulation is an input tax
t which increases marginal costs. In the ﬁrst stage, the multinational chooses
a location structure for a given tax, as described in the previous section. In
the second stage, ﬁrms play Cournot competition. The game is solved by
backwards induction.
The notation is as follows: There are two countries k ∈ {home, foreign}, and
two ﬁrms X and Y which produce a homogeneous good consumed in both
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countries. The amount of the good produced by ﬁrm X (Y) and consumed
in country k is denoted by xk (yk). Consumers in each country have linear
demand pk = a − xk − yk, where p denotes the price of the good and a is a
market parameter. Firm Y produces in the foreign country. It is inactive and
cannot relocate in the ﬁrst stage of the game.13 The analysis focuses on ﬁrm
X, which is initially located in the home country. It can relocate production
if it is a multinational, and can not do so if it is a national ﬁrm.
The cost structures of both ﬁrms consist of two parts: There are constant
marginal costs, which consist of production costs m, transportation costs s
if the ﬁrm exports to the other country, and the input tax t of ﬁrm X if
it produces at home. Plant speciﬁc ﬁxed costs F arise if the multinational
moves production. For simplicity, I assume that F ≡ F pr = F cr. If part of
the production takes place in the foreign country, the multinational is able to
move production completely without further costs.
Standard calculations yield ﬁrm X’s variable proﬁts for a given tax in the home
country, and for each possible location structure:14 With two ﬁrms having
constant marginal costs cx and cy, and linear demand with slope -1, standard
derivations show that the multinational sells xk = 1
3
(a − 2ckx + cky), and ﬁrm
Y sells yk = 1
3
(a − 2cky + ckx) in each market. Variable proﬁts in each market
are Πkx =
1
9
(a− 2ckx + cky)2 and Πky = 19(a− 2cky + ckx)
2
respectively. Straight-
forward application and accounting for ﬁxed costs yields the relevant proﬁt
functions for each location structure.15
Proposition 2 Suppose the following conditions are satisﬁed:
(i) s ≥ 0; t ≥ 0,
(ii) a−m ≥ 2(s+ t),
(iii) F ∈ [4
9
(a−m− s); 1
9
(a−m)2].
A multinational and a national ﬁrm have the same stakes in the home market
if the tax is small. If the tax reaches a critical level, a multinational ﬁrm has
smaller stakes in the home market.
Proof. The proof is given in the appendix.
The conditions of this proposition result from assumptions 1 to 4, and from
application of proposition 1:
13Firm Y can be interpreted as the rest of the market.
14Compare for instance Tirole (1988, Chapt. 5.4).
15Πnr(s, t) = 19 [(a−m+ s− 2t)2 + (a−m− 2s− 2t)2],
Πpr(s, t) = 19 [(a−m+ s− 2t)2 + (a−m)2]− F ,
Πcr(s, t) = 19 [(a−m− s)2 + (a−m)2]− F .
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Fixed costs for relocation are independent of the location structure, therefore
assumption 4 is trivially satisﬁed. Assumption 1 requests that upper and lower
bounds for s and t exist, such that all markets are served for parameters within
this range. Conditions (i) and (ii) of proposition 2 deﬁne these bounds. Note
that the upper bounds of s and t depend on each other. The highest possible
tax rate depends on the height of transportation costs and vice versa. These
conditions imply s(t) = (a −m)/2 − t, t(s) = (a −m)/2 − s. Assumptions 2
and 3 are then satisﬁed as well, as is shown in the appendix. The conditions
of proposition 1 are satisﬁed if and only if F lies within the stated parameter
range. Therefore, the general result of proposition 1 holds, and the result
follows.16
One particular shape for the proﬁt functions is given in ﬁgure 3 above. This
is not the only possible shape. Three diﬀerent cases might arise, depending
of the values of s and t. To distinguish these, I deﬁne s∗ as a critical level of
transportation costs. If s > s∗, the multinational will never relocate completely
to the foreign country. The critical level of transportation costs results from
the condition Πpr(s, t) = Πcr(s, t), which deﬁnes s∗. It states that proﬁts under
complete relocation are the same as proﬁts with partial relocation, given that
the tax level reaches its maximum level t. In this case, the multinational will
never relocate completely. Even if regulation takes its maximum value, proﬁts
with partial relocation are at least as high as proﬁts with complete relocation.17
We get from the above condition
s∗ ≡ 1
4
(a−m).
The following values of the tax parameter will be used in corollary 2. They
deﬁne critical levels of transportation costs, such that the multinational is
indiﬀerent between no relocation and partial relocation (t1), and partial relo-
cation and complete relocation (t2). These values depend on transportation
costs and moving costs. t1 results from the condition Πnr(s, t) = Πpr(s, t) ,
and t2 from Πpr(s, t) = Πcr(s, t):
t1 ≡ 1
2
[
(a−m− 2s)−
√
(a−m)2 − 9F
]
,
t2 ≡ 1
2
(a−m− 1
2
s) +
√
1
4
[
(a−m)2 − s(a−m) + 1
4
s
]
− 4s2 − 9
8
F.
The following corollary gives the explicit solutions of this Cournot model:
16For derivations of the relevant parameter ranges consult the proof in the appendix.
17Note that markets are not separated completely if s > s∗, because partial relocation
may be optimal.
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Corollary 2 Suppose that the conditions of proposition 2 are satisﬁed. It is
possible to distinguish three cases.
The multinational does not relocate completely if transportation costs are high
(s > s∗). It produces in the home country and exports to the foreign country
if taxes are low (t ≤ t1). If taxes are high (t > t1), the multinational relocates
partly and serves both markets through local production.
If transportation costs are small (s < s∗), but s > t1, three diﬀerent location
structure arise:
• The multinational does not relocate if t < t1 < s.
• The multinational relocates partly if t1 < t < s.
• The multinational relocates completely if t1 < s < t.
If transportation costs are low (s < s∗), and s < t1, the multinational will
never produce in both countries:
• The multinational does not relocate if t < t2.
• The multinational relocates completely if t > t2.
Proof. The proof is given in the appendix.
The intuition corresponds to the former section. For a graphical illustration
compare ﬁgure 3: The right hand side illustrates the case of high transportation
costs (s > s∗). It never pays to relocate completely, even if regulation is
very high. The left hand side illustrates the case of low transportation costs
(t1 < s < s∗). If pays to relocate partially if regulation is intermediate. If it is
suﬃciently high, complete relocation is the best choice.
Figure 4 shows how the relocation decision depends on transportation costs,
ﬁxed costs and taxes. Note that ﬁxed costs inﬂuence the critical tax levels t1
and t2.
Note that the decision between partial and complete relocation depends on
the comparison of transportation costs and taxes. It is independent of mov-
ing costs, because partial and complete relocation induce the same amount
of ﬁxed costs. It never pays to relocate completely to the foreign country
if transportation costs are high, because tax savings cannot compensate for
transportation costs. If the tax reaches a critical level such that relocation
becomes optimal, the multinational considers whether to relocate completely
or partly in this case. This decision depends solely on the trade-oﬀ between
tax savings through complete relocation and higher transportation costs. If
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Figure 4: Optimal location decisions of a national ﬁrm in the Cournot example.
The location decision depends on transportation costs s and taxes t, and ﬁxed
costs.
transportation costs are high, tax savings are too small to induce complete
relocation. This is the case even if tax payments take on their highest possible
value.18
If transportation costs are low, two cases may arise: complete immediate relo-
cation (s < t1), and partial relocation ﬁrst (s > t1). In both cases it is optimal
to relocate completely if the tax is suﬃciently high. High tax savings dom-
inate transportation costs. The question remains whether the multinational
should relocate completely once the tax reaches a critical level. This decision
depends on the amount of moving costs: The critical tax level t1 decreases if
moving costs are low. Hence lower ﬁxed costs imply that the multinational
reacts faster towards a tax increase. If s > t1, moving costs and the critical tax
level which induces relocation are small. Transportation costs are high enough
such that it pays to move only partially. In such a situation, it is better to
face moving costs than to pay taxes, but it is also better to pay taxes than
to pay transportation costs. Only if the tax rises further, complete relocation
becomes optimal. If s < t1, transportation costs are small enough such that
complete relocation is optimal once the trade-oﬀ between ﬁxed costs and lower
taxes induces relocation. Hence transportation costs are too small to play any
role in the decision between complete and partial relocation. Relocation re-
duces to the decision between ﬁxed costs and tax payments, if transportation
18Remember that the upper bound of t depends negatively on transportation costs.
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costs are low.
In sum, multinational enterprizes have smaller stakes in the home country than
national ﬁrms, if certain conditions are met. Low transportation costs and low
costs of relocation make this diﬀerence more likely. Regulation becomes more
important and the multinational can easily relocate production, which leads
to diﬀerent stakes of both types of ﬁrms. This argument contrasts with the
perception that multinationals have a higher inﬂuence on the political process
than national ﬁrms. In contrast, it indicates that multinationals have smaller
stakes in the home country. They care less about national regulation, which
tends to decrease lobbying incentives. But if multinationals do not care about
national politics, perhaps it is politicians who care about multinationals?
4 The lobbying game
This section focuses on the eﬀectiveness of lobbying. It takes the results of the
previous section as a starting point. Multinationals have smaller stakes in the
home market, which tends to decrease lobbying incentives. But incentives to
engage in lobbying depend on its eﬀectiveness. Multinationals might be more
eﬀective in lobbying, compared to national ﬁrms. If this is the case, higher
eﬀectiveness might compensate for lower stakes, which leads to more inﬂuence.
There are several possible reasons why politicians care more about multina-
tionals than about national ﬁrms. For instance, multinationals are quite im-
portant as employers. People care about jobs, and so politicians do. Or politi-
cians might expect positive spillover eﬀects or tax revenue from the presence
of multinational companies. But politicians are also interested in general wel-
fare, partly because they are benevolent, partly because they intend to improve
their chance of reelection. Moreover, they might be interested in contribution
payments. These can be used for election campaigns, personal joy, or may be
stuﬀed into anonymous bank accounts for harder times. This analysis relies
on a diﬀerent aspect of multinational ﬁrms. Multinationals can relocate pro-
duction at lower costs than national ﬁrms. I will determine how this aspect
aﬀects national regulation, if the politician cares about aggregate welfare and
contribution payments.
This section analyzes these issues in a two stage game.19 The game is solved
backwards. In the ﬁrst stage, the ﬁrm decides about an optimal contribution
schedule oﬀered to the politician, C∗(r). The contribution schedule is a menu,
19The approach follows Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and Grossman and Helpman
(1994). Grossman and Helpman (2001) and Polk (2002) provide comprehensive surveys
about this and other approaches towards lobbying.
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which maps regulation into money payments to the politician. The ﬁrm de-
cides about the contribution schedule and takes the politician’s behavior into
account. In the second stage of the game, the politician observes these oﬀers
and decides about the optimal amount of regulation, r∗. Hence [C∗(r), r∗] de-
termines the political equilibrium. Money payments are made, dependent on
the oﬀered contribution schedule and the resulting choice of regulation.20
I take the result of the previous section as a starting point. Proposition 1 states
conditions such that a multinational has smaller stakes in the home market
with suﬃciently high regulation, compared to a national ﬁrm. Corollary 2
applies the general result to a speciﬁc form of Cournot competition. It derives
critical values for the regulation parameter and transportation costs, such that
a multinational has smaller stakes in the home country compared to a national
ﬁrm (compare also ﬁgure 4). In both cases, if regulation is suﬃciently low, both
types of ﬁrms have the same stakes in the domestic market. The focus of this
section lies on diﬀerences between multinational and national ﬁrms. Therefore,
I restrict the analysis to parameter ranges such that both types of ﬁrms have
diﬀerent stakes in national regulation, i.e.
∂ΠNAT (r, s)
∂r
<
∂ΠMNE(r, s)
∂r
holds.
Aggregate welfare depends on the net beneﬁt of regulation, B(r), and the
amount of goods produced and consumed in the home country, qS(r) and
qD(r). The net beneﬁt of regulation might be interpreted as reduced envi-
ronmental damage, higher labor standards, or welfare gains through a higher
degree of competition. The distinction between goods consumed and goods
produced reﬂects the idea that the politician cares about production in the
home country and about consumers’ well being. A good consumed in the
home country increases welfare, but even more if it has been produced there.
Hence, aggregate welfare is a linear function given as
W (r) = W [B(r); qS(r); qD(r)].
Direct eﬀects are assumed to be positive, i.e.
∂W
∂B
> 0,
∂W
∂qS
> 0 and
∂W
∂qD
> 0.
Regulation has a negative impact on the amount of goods produced and con-
sumed in the home country, because regulation increases costs:
∂qS
∂r
< 0;
∂qD
∂r
< 0.
20Cheating is not possible, and money oﬀers are paid as soon as the respective regulation
is realized.
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Note that these assumptions are valid for many speciﬁc forms of competition.
Moreover, I make the following assumption on the beneﬁts of regulation:
Assumption 5 The beneﬁt function B(r) is concave, has a unique maximum,
and rb = argmaxr B(r).
I make the two following assumptions, which state that a multinational and a
national ﬁrm react diﬀerently if regulation increases. Both reduce production;
however, the multinational can escape national regulation, since it is able to
relocate production to the foreign country and thus escape national regulation
at least partially. In contrast, the national ﬁrm is bound to produce in the
home country. Hence, the eﬀect of regulation on domestic production should
be higher if the ﬁrm is a multinational. But relocation has also a positive
eﬀect on consumption in the home country. The multinational escapes national
regulation, and costs rise to a smaller extent compared to a national ﬁrm.21
Hence, the eﬀect of regulation on consumption is negative for both types of
ﬁrms, and it is stronger if the ﬁrm is national.
Assumption 6 (relocation eﬀect): The negative eﬀect of regulation on pro-
duction in the home country is stronger if the ﬁrm is a multinational:
∂qS
∂r
∣∣∣∣
MNE
<
∂qS
∂r
∣∣∣∣
NAT
< 0.
Assumption 7 (consumption eﬀect): The negative eﬀect of regulation on
consumption is weaker if the ﬁrm is a multinational:
∂qD
∂r
∣∣∣∣
NAT
<
∂qD
∂r
∣∣∣∣
MNE
< 0.
Consider now the second stage of the game. A rational politician decides
about regulation. He cares about aggregate welfare and contributions. Con-
tribution oﬀers result from ﬁrms’ optimization in the ﬁrst stage of the game.
The politician takes these oﬀers as given and decides about regulation. Thus in
the second stage of the game, the politician chooses r to maximize his payoﬀ,
given the contribution schedule C(r):
max
r
U(r) = W [B(r); qS(r); qD(r)] + αC(r).
The ﬁrm is either a national or a multinational company, and I compare polit-
ical outcomes with both types of ﬁrms. α ≥ 0 is a weight which speciﬁes the
21Recall that the ﬁrm bears increased transportation costs to serve the home market. The
total eﬀect is positive, because otherwise relocation is not optimal.
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impact of money to the politician’s payoﬀ. Note that the politician’s payoﬀ
function is separable in aggregate welfare and contribution payments. This is
a common assumption, which assures that no interaction between contribution
payments and aggregate welfare exist.22
The optimal amount of regulation, r∗, is determined by the following ﬁrst order
condition:
∂W (r)
∂r
+ α
∂C(r)
∂r
= 0.
As a special case, consider a benevolent politician who does not care for con-
tributions, i.e. α = 0. In this case, the politician maximizes aggregate welfare
and chooses r0 = argmax W (r). By observation of the ﬁrst order condi-
tion, the following insights result: The marginal (net) beneﬁt of regulation is
positive in equilibrium, because the politician trades-oﬀ net beneﬁts from reg-
ulation with negative eﬀects on consumption and production. This results in
regulation r0 < rb. If the politician cares about contributions, political costs
of regulation change. They may increase or decrease, which depends on the
eﬀect of regulation on contribution payments. Note that I cannot specify this
function at the moment, because it depends on the ﬁrm’s optimization in the
ﬁrst stage of the game. Suppose that it turns out that contributions decrease
in r. In this case, regulation decreases if the politician cares for contributions,
i.e. r∗ < r0 < rb. Lower regulation results and aggregate welfare declines. If
contributions increase in r, regulation with lobbying will be higher than the
welfare maximizing level, i.e. r∗ > r0. It may even be higher than rb, which is
the maximum of the beneﬁt function. I will restrict my attention to decreas-
ing contribution schedules in the following. This is natural to do so, because
the following arguments show that contribution oﬀers can only increase if the
lobbying ﬁrm has an interest in high regulation. This is never the case if the
ﬁrm produces at least partly in the home country. It may only result if the
multinational completely relocates and beneﬁts from high domestic regulation
through a raising rivals’ costs argument. I will exclude this special case in the
following, but indicate here that it may arise in general.23
Consider now the ﬁrst stage of the game. The ﬁrm anticipates the behavior of
the politician. It realizes that in order to induce a deviation from r0 towards
22To be more precise, separability assures that income is transferable without loss. The
marginal utility of income is constant at rate α, and is independent of the level of aggregate
utility. To illustrate this point, consider a payoﬀ function of the form U = U [W (r), C(r)],
and U concave in W and C. In this case, the marginal utility of contributions decreases
in C. Moreover, it may also depend on the total level of aggregate welfare, because this
speciﬁcation allows that ∂
2U
∂C∂W 	= 0.
23Some countries prohibit lobbying activities by foreign ﬁrms, as for instance the United
States.
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any alternative regulation, the contribution schedule must locally satisfy the
politician’s ﬁrst order condition around the preferred level of regulation. If this
was not the case, the politician would not deviate in the second stage of the
game facing the respective contribution schedule. Thus, in order to induce a
policy deviation towards any regulation, the contribution schedule must satisfy
the following condition in the neighborhood of r:
∂C(r)
∂r
= − 1
α
∂W (r)
∂r
.
Integration yields
C(r) = − 1
α
W (r) + x.
Thus, any contribution schedule which shall be suitable to induce a certain
regulation policy r must satisfy the stated form locally. This is a necessary
condition for the contribution schedule. Note that contribution payments for
a deviation towards a particular regulation depend on the induced level of
aggregate welfare, the weight α, and a ﬁxed parameter x, which shifts the
contribution schedule vertically and will be discussed in the following.
To understand what determines x, we have to take the maximization problem
of the ﬁrm into account. The ﬁrm maximizes net proﬁts, which are variable
proﬁts minus contribution payments, Π(r, s) − C(r).24 Note that the ﬁrm
determines a complete menu oﬀer, which consists of contribution oﬀers for all
possible regulations. This is a complete function C(r), which is more than the
contribution payment for the equilibrium policy choice r∗. The ﬁrm has to take
three constraints into account: First, any contribution schedule which induces
a deviation from r0 must satisfy the above form locally at the realized level of
regulation. Otherwise it would not induce the proper behavior of the politician
in the second stage of the game. Second, to induce a political outcome diﬀerent
from r0, the contribution payment needs to compensate the politician for the
deviation from his welfare maximizing policy r0. Hence, the ﬁrm must consider
the politician’s participation constraint, which is W (r) + αC(r) ≥ W (r0).
Third, it is optimal to oﬀer positive payments only for certain policies if the
resulting net proﬁts including contribution payments exceed proﬁts which are
realized if no contributions occur and r0 results, Π(r0, s). Hence contributions
are positive for any regulation r only if Π(r, s)− C(r) ≥ Π(r0, s).
The ﬁrm solves
maxC(r) Π(r, s)− C(r) s.t. C(r) = − 1αW (r) + x
W (r) + αC(r) ≥ W (r0)
Π(r, s)− C(r) ≥ Π(r0, s).
24With slight abuse of notation, I drop the suﬃxes for ﬁrm types. The assumptions hold
for both types in the same way.
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Note that x is a parameter which shifts proﬁts to the politician on account
of the ﬁrm. If x is high, higher contribution payments are made in exchange
for a policy deviation. Hence the ﬁrm has an interest to choose x as low as
possible, but high enough to induce the preferred policy outcome. From the
ﬁrst and second constraint of the ﬁrm maximization problem follows
x ≥ 1
α
W (r0).
Hence any contribution schedule satisfying
C(r) ≥ 1
α
[
W (r0)−W (r)]
is suitable to induce a policy deviation from r0. Moreover, the ﬁrm will always
choose the smallest amount of contribution payments which are suﬃcient to
induce a certain policy deviation from r0, because contribution payments are
not costless. Thus the equation must be binding in order to maximize proﬁts,
and any contribution schedule which entails higher payments for all levels of
regulation can not optimal: The ﬁrm could always increase proﬁts through a
slight reduction of x in this case, without aﬀecting the policy outcome.
Hence, if the ﬁrm anticipates how the politician decides in the second stage
of the game, it realizes that any policy r is feasible through a contribution
schedule satisfying
C(r) =
1
α
[
W (r0)−W (r)]
in the neighborhood of r. Intuitively, contribution payments compensate the
politician for a policy deviation from r0, which exactly oﬀsets his induced util-
ity decline. As a consequence, he is indiﬀerent between the welfare maximizing
policy r0 and any alternative induced through this contribution oﬀer. Note that
the ﬁrm beneﬁts from a ﬁrst mover advantage. It anticipates how the politi-
cian reacts towards any possible contribution schedule C(r) and minimizes
compensation payments given that they are suitable to induce the preferred
policy outcome, and it realizes the full rent from the political interaction.
Note that it is not optimal to oﬀer positive compensation payments according
to the above equation to any r, because this may violate the participation
constraint of the ﬁrm. Hence the ﬁrm prefers to pay zero contributions for
any policy deviation which necessitates compensation payments exceeding the
beneﬁt from deviation, and an optimal contribution schedule satisﬁes C(r) = 0
for any r satisfying Π(r, s)− 1
α
[W (r0)−W (r)] ≤ Π(r0, s).25
25To be more precise, zero contribution oﬀers are not necessary. It suﬃces that they are
small enough to not aﬀect the policy outcome (compare the appendix).
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Consider the following contribution schedule as a suggestion for the solution
to the maximization problem:
C(r) =
{
0 , if Π(r, s)− 1
α
[W (r0)−W (r)] ≤ Π(r0, s)
1
α
[W (r0)−W (r)] , if Π(r, s)− 1
α
[W (r0)−W (r)] > Π(r0, s).
This contribution schedule satisﬁes all conditions of the maximization problem.
Contribution payments are positive only if the proﬁt increase through the in-
duced policy deviation exceeds the contribution payments which are necessary
to induce this outcome; otherwise they equal zero. The ﬁrm exactly compen-
sates the politician for the respective policy deviation from r0 if contribution
payments are positive. Note that this contribution schedule has an interesting
property: Since any positive contribution payment exactly compensates the
politician for the policy deviation, he remains indiﬀerent between the welfare
maximizing regulation r0, and any deviation associated with positive contri-
bution payments.
In fact, the ﬁrm is able to induce its most preferred policy outcome through a
slight modiﬁcation of the above contribution schedule. This is an implication
of the ﬁrst mover advantage: Anticipating the politician’s behavior, the ﬁrm is
able to induce its preferred policy through the choice of a suitable contribution
schedule as long as the contribution function satisﬁes the stated constraints.
The optimal policy choice r∗, given that the ﬁrm compensates the politician
for the deviation, is given by the ﬁrst order condition of the ﬁrm. Hence
r∗ = argmaxr Π(r, s)− 1
α
[
W (r0)−W (r)] ,
This result states that the ﬁrm prefers a policy choice whose marginal beneﬁt
exactly oﬀsets the marginal costs which are necessary to achieve it. This al-
lows us to determine the optimal contribution schedule. To be precise, there
is an inﬁnite number of optimal contribution schedules C∗(r) which imple-
ments the most preferred outcome: The reason is as follows: The ﬁrm must
compensate the politician for the policy deviation towards r∗, as character-
ized above. Contribution oﬀers must be zero for all policy variables satisfying
Π(r, s) − 1
α
[W (r0)−W (r)] ≤ Π(r0, s). But the contribution oﬀers distinct
from C∗(r∗) and not satisfying this latter condition are arbitrary as long as
they induce no other policy deviation. I restrict attention to one particular
form:26
26The complete speciﬁcation of all optimal contribution schedules is given in the appendix.
The form stated here satisﬁes the ”natural” reﬁnement of Kirchsteiger and Prat (2002).
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Lemma 1 The following contribution schedule solves the maximization prob-
lem of the ﬁrm:
C∗(r) =
{
0 , if r 	= r∗
1
α
[W (r0)−W (r)] , if r = r∗
This particular contribution schedule is optimal for the ﬁrm. It oﬀers a com-
pensation payment for a policy deviation towards r∗, which leaves the politician
indiﬀerent between the welfare maximizing policy r0 and the most preferred
policy of the ﬁrm.27 Contribution oﬀers for all other policies are zero. Hence
the contribution schedule induces a policy deviation towards r∗, which is the
best policy choice of the ﬁrm. Note that zero contribution oﬀers result for two
reasons: Some contribution oﬀers are zero, because the ﬁrm realizes that it
cannot induce the respective policy deviation and gain something. Hence it
oﬀers nothing. In contrast, some policy deviations are feasible for the ﬁrm, be-
cause necessary compensation payments are smaller compared to the resulting
beneﬁt. But although feasible generally, it is not optimal to induce them be-
cause they do not maximize ﬁrm’s proﬁts net of contribution payments. Hence
the ﬁrm can oﬀer zero contributions for these policy choices as well.
The form of the optimal contribution schedule is the same for a multinational
and a national ﬁrm for a broad range of r. Both ﬁrms pay positive contribu-
tions which are suﬃcient to compensate the politician for a policy deviation
towards its most preferred policy choice. But the contribution schedules diﬀer
with respect to four aspects: First, the intervals of feasible policy deviations
diﬀer between both types of ﬁrm, because they depend on Π(r, s) and Π(r0, s)
which are diﬀerent for the multinational and the national ﬁrm. Second, r0 dif-
fers in both cases: The politician chooses a diﬀerent regulation policy without
lobbying, which depends on the present type of ﬁrm. Third, equilibrium con-
tribution payments compensate the politician for a deviation from r0. These
compensations depend on the loss in aggregate welfare if regulation decreases.
Welfare depends on the amount of goods which are produced and consumed
in the home country, and these amounts change diﬀerently for both types of
ﬁrms (assumptions 6 and 7). Finally, the optimal policy choice r∗ may diﬀer
between a national and a multinational ﬁrm.
Note that equilibrium contribution payments tend to be high if the politician
cares much about welfare. In this case α is small, and the ﬁrm must oﬀer high
compensation payments to induce a policy deviation. As a result, ﬁrm’s payoﬀ
decreases if the politician cares much about aggregate welfare, and more money
is transferred on behalf of the politician. The politician’s payoﬀ is independent
27I assume that the politician deviates if he is indiﬀerent. Otherwise the ﬁrm could
increase the contribution payment for r∗ by a small amount, and the politician would be
strictly better oﬀ with deviation.
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of α, because he gets exactly compensated for the equilibrium policy deviation.
For instance, if he cares much about aggregate welfare contribution payments
tend to be high in equilibrium, but his marginal beneﬁt of money is small in
this case.
This result can be used to solve the model completely. The ﬁrm determines
the optimal contribution schedule C∗(r) in the ﬁrst stage of the game. It
anticipates the politician’s behavior of the second stage and induces a certain
policy outcome, r∗. Thus [C∗(r), r∗] determines the political equilibrium.28
This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3 The multinational company tends to face lower regulation com-
pared to a national ﬁrm, if the following conditions hold:
• The consumption eﬀect is relatively unimportant, or consumption has
only small welfare eﬀects.
• The multinational and the national ﬁrm do not diﬀer much with respect
to their stakes in national regulation.
The multinational tends to face higher regulation compared to a national ﬁrm,
if the following condition holds:
• The relocation eﬀect is small if the ﬁrm is a multinational, or production
is unimportant for aggregate welfare.
Proof. The proof is given in the appendix.
By assumption, regulation has a positive direct eﬀect on aggregate welfare and
negative eﬀects on consumption and production in the home country. The re-
location eﬀect tends to lower regulation if the ﬁrm is a multinational, because
regulation aﬀects national production to a greater extent in this case. Hence,
if the politician cares much about production in the home country and the
relocation eﬀect is large, regulation might favor the interests of the multina-
tional company. The consumption eﬀect works in the opposite direction. The
multinational company is able to escape national regulation at least partially
and the negative eﬀect on domestic consumption is smaller in this case. This
eﬀect tends towards higher regulation of multinational companies.
The proposition also covers the ﬁrst part of the analysis: Both types of ﬁrms
may have diﬀerent stakes in domestic regulation, which depends on exogenous
parameters as described in section 3. In this case, a national ﬁrm is c.p.
28Note that an inﬁnite amount of equilibria exists, because an inﬁnite number of optimal
contribution schedules induce the optimal policy deviation r∗.
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willing to oﬀer higher contribution payments at the margin, because national
regulation aﬀects it to a greater extent. As a result, regulation tends to be
lower if national ﬁrms are present compared to multinationals. With only small
stakes in the home market, multinationals’ incentives to engage in lobbying are
small. The extent of this eﬀect depends on the marginal beneﬁt of contribution
payments. If the politician cares much about contributions, the tendency
towards lower regulation of national ﬁrms increases.
The model predicts that the existence of multinational ﬁrms has ambiguous ef-
fects on national regulation, which raises scepticism about the common percep-
tion that the presence of multinational companies leads to a loss of sovereignty
of the national state. In this setup, rather strict conditions must be fulﬁlled to
support this view. However, it may well be valid if relocation is very impor-
tant. Which view is suitable comes down to an empirical test of the relative
strength of these eﬀects. If it turns out that politicians have a high interest in
local production and relocation is an important issue, the model may support
the common perception. If this is not the case, multinationals tend to face
higher regulation than national ﬁrms, and the presence of these ﬁrms does not
reduce the scope of national policy making.
5 Discussion and conclusions
The approach provides a formal analysis how diﬀerences in lobbying incentives
between a multinational and a national ﬁrm aﬀect the political outcome. It
is independent of speciﬁc market forms or the type of competition. A multi-
national diﬀers from a national ﬁrm because it has smaller costs of relocating
production. Smaller stakes in the national market result, and a multinational
can always perform at least as good as a national ﬁrm. National regulation
tends to have smaller impacts on multinationals, which tends to decrease their
lobbying incentives. Less inﬂuence on the political decision can then be ex-
pected. This argument suggests that multinationals tend to face higher regu-
lation than national ﬁrms. In addition, consumer surplus declines less in the
home country if regulation aﬀects multinationals. These two eﬀects, the lobby-
ing eﬀect and the consumption eﬀect, tend towards an outcome of the lobbying
game which neglects the common perception that multinationals reduce the
scope of national politics.
An eﬀect which works in favor of less regulation of multinational ﬁrms is the
production eﬀect. Multinationals may relocate production due to unwanted
regulation, which decreases local production to a higher extent compared to
national ﬁrms. If politicians are interested in domestic production, they might
be hesitant to introduce high regulation in order to avoid a drain of capital. If
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this eﬀect is strong, the presence of multinational companies may well lead to
a loss of sovereignty of the nation state.
The paper provides some hypothesis for empirical investigation. Less regula-
tion of multinationals should coincide with the importance of local production
to politicians. Moreover, regulation should be lax in sectors with relatively
footloose capital, compared to sectors where relocation is costly. Regulation of
multinationals should be lax if lobbying is not too important, or the politician
cares not much about contribution payments. For instance, a politician might
have less discretion to set policies in sectors facing much public attention. In
contrast, it might be easier to cater to special interests in sectors attracting
little public attention, and contributions might be of higher importance then.
Let me ﬁnally discuss two possible extensions. First, we can relax the assump-
tion that only one ﬁrm is present in the market. I conjecture that the extension
to several domestic and multinational ﬁrms does not aﬀect the main insights.
The fact that the possibility to relocate production induces diﬀerences in lob-
bying incentives does not depend on the number of politically active ﬁrms.
However, such an extension would allow to analyze incentives to free-ride on
other ﬁrms and may be worthy of consideration in future research. Second,
politicians and multinationals might have asymmetric information about the
possible extent of relocation. A multinational might be better informed about
its production and costs structure than the politician. I expect that regulation
works more in favor of the multinational in this case.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
A necessary and suﬃcient condition that the ﬁrm relocates at some level of
regulation is given, if it is optimal to relocate at least partially if the regulation
takes on its tightest form. These conditions are given by
max {Πpr(r, s)− F pr; Πcr(r, s)− F cr} > Πnr(r, s).
This can be rewritten as in condition (i).
Next one has to assure that a regulation exists such that it is optimal to
produce in the home market only. Proﬁts not only decrease in regulation
(assumption 2), but even faster if production takes place in the home country
only (assumption 3). Thus it is necessary and suﬃcient to check whether it
is optimal to produce in the home market if regulation takes on its minimum
level. This condition is given by
Πnr(0, s) > max {Πpr(0, s)− F pr; Πcr(0, s)− F cr}.
Denote F prcrit(r) as the critical level of ﬁxed costs which makes the ﬁrm in-
diﬀerent between moving partially and staying in the home country if regu-
lation is r. Thus F prcrit(r) ≡ Πpr(r, s) − Πnr(r, s). Diﬀerentiating yields that
this critical value is increasing in r by assumptions 2 and 3. Analogously,
F crcrit(r) ≡ Πcr(r, s) − Πnr(r, s) is increasing in r. By comparing these critical
values, one gets that ﬁxed moving costs increase faster in r in the case of com-
plete relocation (again by assumption 3). Thus the relevant assumption must
be Πnr(0, s) > Πpr(0, s)− F pr, as stated in part (ii) of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Using standard technique one can derive the quantities sold by each ﬁrm in
each market for every possible production structure of the multinational. By
assumption 1, each of these quantities must be positive. This gives assump-
tions on the relationship between the demand parameter a, marginal cost of
production m, transportation costs s and the tax t. These assumptions are
satisﬁed if a−m ≥ 2(s+ t) holds.
Straight forward application of standard oligopoly theory then yields the fol-
lowing proﬁt functions for the multinational:
Πnr(s, t) = 1
9
[(a−m+ s− 2t)2 + (a−m− 2s− 2t)2],
Πpr(s, t) = 1
9
[(a−m+ s− 2t)2 + (a−m)2]− F,
Πcr(s, t) = 1
9
[(a−m− s)2 + (a−m)2]− F.
Taking derivatives, it is easy to check that assumptions 2 and 3 are satisﬁed.
Thus all assumptions are satisﬁed.
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Part (i) of proposition 1 gives an upper bound for the ﬁxed cost parameter F .
Simply plug tmax = 1
2
(a−m)− s into the proﬁt functions and compare. This
give the upper bound which is stated in part (iii) of proposition 2.
Part (ii) of proposition 1 gives a lower bound for F . Set t = 0 and compare
proﬁts without relocation and with partial relocation. This gives the lower
bound, which is stated in part (iii) of proposition 2.
Hence the conditions stated in proposition 2 assure that all assumptions of
proposition 1 are satisﬁed and the result follows.
Proof of Corollary 2:
We know that the ﬁrm produces in the home country only, if the tax is small.
The case of high transportation costs
If Πpr(s, tmax) > Πcr(s, tmax), it can never be optimal to relocate completely
for any value of t. Plug in the value of tmax and see that this is the case if
s > 1
4
(a−m), which is the critical value s∗. The critical value of the tax where
relocation is pays is given by t1.
The case of low transportation costs
By the former result, complete relocation pays for some tax level if s < s∗. It
has to be clariﬁed if partial relocation is optimal for some interval on t, or not.
This can be done by comparing the values of the proﬁt functions at t = t1.
If Πpr(s, t1) > Πcr(s, t1), proﬁts are higher at t1 if the ﬁrm does not relocate
completely, but only partially to the foreign country. This condition yields
(s − t1)(a − m − t1) > 0, which is equivalent to s > t1. We know that
complete relocation is optimal if the tax is high enough. Thus to determine
the relevant critical value, one has to ﬁnd the value of the tax such that the
ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between partial and complete relocation. This yields t = s
as the critical value and completes the proof if t1 < s < s∗.
For the case of s < s∗ and s < t1, the proof is analogous. If Πpr(s, t1) <
Πcr(s, t1), production in both countries is not optimal if t = t1. Thus a smaller
level t2 must exist, such that immediate complete relocation is optimal. This
value is determined by comparing Πpr(s, t) and Πcr(s, t), which yields the re-
spective value for t2.
Complete speciﬁcation of the optimal contribution schedule:
There is an inﬁnite number of optimal contribution schedules which satisfy the
stated conditions. Remember that
r∗ = argmaxr Π(r, s)− 1
α
[
W (r0)−W (r)] .
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All contribution schedules of the following form are optimal:
C∗(r) =
{
1
α
[W (r0)−W (r)] , if r = r∗
1
α
[W (r0)−W (r)]− !(r) , if r 	= r∗
The function !(r) is an element of a class of functions satisfying
• !(r) > 0, and
• !(r) ≤ 1
α
[W (r0)−W (r)].
Proof of Proposition 3:
We know that the politicians chooses r∗ in the second stage of the game, given
C∗(r). Hence in equilibrium
∂C(r)
∂r
= − 1
α
∂W (r)
∂r
.
Note that I assume diﬀerentiability of the contribution function around r∗ here,
which is slightly imprecise with respect to the stated contribution schedule of
lemma 1. From the preceding discussion, continuous contribution function
around r∗ are easy to ﬁnd. Hence I ignore this slight imprecision here.
We also know that this induces the optimal policy choice of the ﬁrm, r∗. By
the ﬁrst order condition of the ﬁrm, we get
∂Π(r, s)
∂r
= − 1
α
[
∂W
∂B
∂B(r)
∂r
+
∂W
∂qS
∂qS(r)
∂r
+
∂W
∂qD
∂qD(r)
∂r
]
around the equilibrium. The result follows from comparison of this ﬁrst order
condition if the ﬁrm is national or a multinational.
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